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The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Experts Group tasked the Risk and Safety 
Working Group (RSWG) with assessing the high-level safety design characteristics of all six 
GIF systems. The objective is to review and identify the main safety advantages and possible 
challenges of the individual technologies, with a view to assess the current status of safety-
related research & development (R&D) activities and identify future R&D needs for each 
system. In this context, the RSWG requested that the GIF Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) 
provisional System Steering Committee (pSSC) prepare a system safety assessment (SSA) 
document summarizing the safety advantages and challenges of LFR concepts under 
consideration. The present report is structured according to the “table of contents” below as 
proposed by the RSWG.  
In preparing this assessment, the LFR pSSC has placed emphasis on the outcomes of safety-
related R&D for the GIF LFR Reference Systems and the review of LFR safety aspects by the 
French “Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire” (IRSN) [1].  
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1. General overview of the performance goals 
The path to develop advanced nuclear reactors offering possible performance advantages over 
current reactor systems has been outlined in the Generation IV Technology Roadmap, which 
was prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Research Advisory 
Committee (NERAC) and the Generation IV International Forum in 2002 [2] and further 
updated in 2014 [3]. 




 Safety and reliability; and 
 Proliferation resistance and physical protection. 
In addition, the Roadmap identified six types of reactor systems, collectively known as 
“Generation IV” or “Gen IV” systems that are considered the most promising reactor 
technologies to achieve these goals and thereby enhance the future role of nuclear energy. These 
six reactor types are the Molten Salt Reactor (MSR), the Supercritical Water Reactor (SCWR), 
the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR), the Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR), the Sodium-
cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), and the Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR).  
In the following sections the four Generation IV goals are analyzed with the aim to show how 
the LFR can implement such high-level desiderata through specific aspects of the technology. 
Technology related challenges concerning safety aspects are detailed in the specific and proper 
sections of the paper starting with section 4 and ending with the R&D needs arising from such 
analysis in section 8. 
1.1 Sustainability 
The LFR, as a fast reactor system with its associated closed fuel cycle, is particularly effective 
in fully utilizing the energy value of uranium, both its fissile and fertile components, as well as 
thorium as a fertile material. It has been estimated that fast reactor fuel cycles can provide 
factors of 40 to 100 times greater fuel utilization than existing thermal reactor fuel cycles, 
depending on the reactor design and the fuel cycle parameters [4]. Additionally, the LFR can 
effectively consume plutonium and other transuranic elements that have accumulated from past 
and ongoing Generation I through III+ nuclear fuel cycles. These capabilities thus fully support 
the first Generation IV goal of increased sustainability. The neutronic properties of lead and 
lead-bismuth coolants1 (low neutron absorption and moderation) readily enable sustaining a 
hard neutron energy spectrum, providing good neutron economy and performance flexibility. 
                                                 
 
1 The principal coolants proposed for LFR systems are pure lead and lead-bismuth eutectic, or LBE, the eutectic 
alloy of lead (44.5 wt.%) and bismuth (55.5 wt.%). The GIF Reference Systems each use pure lead as the coolant, 
but other LFR systems being developed globally use LBE. 




The LFR can therefore efficiently breed new fissile material, or consume transuranic elements, 
which have accumulated during past decades, thus minimizing the volume and radiotoxicity of 
long-lived, high-level waste.  
Thorium, which is even more abundant than uranium, could also be used as a fertile material to 
further burn transuranic elements with little new generation of plutonium and minor actinides 
(MAs) coupled with generation of 233U. 
In summary, the LFR offers the potential for very high efficiency in fuel utilization, burning of 
long-lived actinide components of high-level waste, and utilization of the thorium fuel cycle, 
and therefore can be considered a very attractive option to achieve the goal of long-term 
sustainability. 
1.2 Economics 
The second goal area for Generation IV systems, economic performance, is generally difficult 
to quantify for new, advanced systems, yet there are several characteristics of LFR systems that 
suggest the potential for advantageous economic performance. Key among these characteristics 
are: 
 The relatively inert chemical nature of the lead (or lead-bismuth) coolant should it come 
in contact with air or water2, which supports simplified designs that do not require 
complex and expensive intermediate systems to isolate the primary coolant from its 
secondary coolant, normally water. The reduced complexity and footprint of such a 
simplified plant will positively impact capital and operational costs and resulting 
economic performance; 
 The very high boiling temperature of the lead coolant (1749ºC) which virtually 
eliminates coolant boiling and the related safety challenges present for other liquid 
coolants enables further simplification of design and safety demonstration; 
 The low partial vapor pressure of lead (2.9∙10-5 Pa at 400°C), which allows primary 
system operation at near atmospheric pressure, avoiding thus the need to maintain 
complex and expensive structures to provide pressure boundaries in LFR systems; 
 The high operating temperature of LFRs, which enables high power conversion 
efficiencies, likely at or above 40%3; 
 An expected long design life (i.e., up to a 60-year design life) with recognition that there 
could be a shorter intended operational time-frame for initial LFR demonstrators; 
                                                 
 
2 We use the terms “relatively inert” and “relative inertness” in this document to reflect the fact that there are no 
rapid exothermic reactions between lead or LBE and air and water.  
3 The efficiency cited here is for LFRs operating at what would be considered safe temperature limits under which 
the corrosion-erosion effects are well-controlled. Operation at higher temperatures, contingent on use of more 
corrosion resistant materials and methods to limit corrosion could offer further improvement in economic 
performance. 




 The use of oxide and nitride fuels that can reach high burnup, improving fuel utilization 
and reducing fuel cycle costs; 
 The fact that load following operations are strongly favoured by the small difference 
between “cold state temperature” and operational temperature;  
 Additionally, the longer times between refueling reduce spent-fuel handling and fuel 
fabrication costs and average refueling outage times. 
In addition, for smaller LFRs, similarly to other small modular reactor (SMR) options that might 
be considered, the limitation on power output may be offset by other factors benefitting from: 
(i) the increased compactness and simplified designs, with increased factory-fabrication of 
(primary) components; and (ii) the application of the “economy of replication”, with mini-serial 
production, standardization, improved quality, and wider supply chain options. 
In summary, good economic performance of LFRs can be expected due to the favorable 
inherent characteristics of the lead coolant leading to: (i) system compactness, greatly reducing 
plant footprint and use of materials; (ii) simplification of design and operation at near 
atmospheric pressure, with reduced size (and number) of the components; (iii) enhanced 
retention of radioactive materials, reducing the resulting source term and consequent 
requirements for emergency planning zone; and (iv) reduced severe accident probability, and 
the related costs for prevention and mitigation measures. The latter two aspects are further 
discussed in Sub-section 1.3.       
1.3 Safety and reliability 
The third goal area for Generation IV systems related to increased safety and reliability is 
receiving increasing emphasis and is expected to be a major condition for public acceptance of 
nuclear power. 
In the area of safety, LFR systems are expected to excel due to the following factors related to 
the favorable basic and intrinsic characteristics of lead as a coolant: 
 The ability to operate at low system operating pressure together with the possible leak-
before-break nature4 of the reactor coolant system boundary, resulting in fault-tolerant 
characteristics; 
 The high primary coolant boiling temperature, well above the melting point of the 
cladding and other structural materials, making the voiding effect associated to a 
“stable” bulk boiling very unlikely, and its consideration hence unnecessary;  
 Concerning the transient presence of voids in the core, for some designs (for example 
BREST-OD-300), the analysis indicates that the presence of steam bubbles (possibly 
                                                 
 
4 The resistance of structural materials to unstable crack growth in heavy liquid metals is currently being studied, 
cf. also Sub-section 4.3.1.  




due to SGTR) do not lead to an increase in reactivity, also benefitting from the high 
hydrostatic pressure in lead5.  
 A complete loss of coolant is prevented by the absence of coolant boil off and low 
chemical interaction potential with environment fluids (water and air); 
 The capability to design an LFR core with a large pitch-to-diameter ratio, providing 
enhanced safety against flow blockage and improved heat removal through higher 
natural circulation; 
 The lead coolant properties in combination with application of dense (U-Pu)N fuel 
allows the breeding of fissile materials in the reactor core with a small reactivity margin 
preventing uncontrolled power increase6;  
 The relatively inert chemical nature of the lead coolant, its high thermal inertia and its 
favorable natural circulation capability promote benign behavior in accident situations 
as well as successful mitigation; 
 As such, because of effective passive decay heat removal due to natural circulation, LFR 
systems are not dependent on off-site power or emergency on-site back-up power for 
successful mitigation of accident conditions7; 
 Possible severe accident initiators related to coolant boiling reactivity void effects are 
highly unlikely due to the very high coolant boiling temperature, even in the case of loss 
of off-site and on-site backup power. In LFRs, high-temperature creep and corrosion do 
not typically challenge structural integrity in the medium-term during loss of off-site 
and on-site backup power [5-6]; 
 In accident situations such as those that might be triggered by extreme (i.e., beyond 
design basis) external events, dedicated experiments and code qualification activities 
[7] have shown that adequate decay heat removal can be achieved using natural 
circulation of the already-available lead coolant in the primary circuit, relying at the 
same time on available ultimate heat sinks such as air or water. Loss of off-site power 
and on-site diesel generators is not considered an extreme event since the entire safety 
analysis is normally performed assuming an absence of external and on-site power 
supply7; 
 The lead coolant provides a capacity for retention of volatile fission products, such as 
cesium and iodine, so that significant accidental release outside the primary coolant 
system is considered to be unlikely [8]; 
 Compared to other technologies, the accumulation of hydrogen does not occur, as 
hydrogen production due to any possible primary coolant interaction with water is 
                                                 
 
5 Such scenarios as well as scenarios involving multiple cladding ruptures (leading to the introduction of non-
condensable gases to the primary coolant) are included in the safety analysis and have to be analyzed for other 
designs as well. 
6 In case the reactivity margin would erroneously be introduced due to equipment failures or operator errors. 
7 R&D is on-going to confirm the conditions of establishment of adequate natural circulation in the system and 
its reliability, cf. also Sub-section 3. 




strongly limited. Moreover, the phenomenology of hydrogen production by metal-water 
interaction, as occurred in Fukushima accident, is excluded by design. 
Finally, with respect to reliability, high levels can be achieved both through design as well as 
using passive safety systems such as natural circulation without pumps, based on fundamental 
physical principles without the need for external power for their operation. 
The implementation of passive safety systems and the principle of Defense-in-Depth (DiD) 
have been introduced into LFR designs from the very early stages, ensuring that safety features 
are “built in” rather than “added on”. 
1.4 Proliferation resistance and physical protection 
The last goal area for Generation IV systems aims at increased proliferation resistance and 
physical protection. These characteristics are enhanced for LFR systems for the reasons that 
follow: 
 As with other fast reactor concepts, the fuel cycle of LFRs is self-sustaining, not 
requiring the generation / supply of additional enriched uranium, plutonium or other 
fissile material. For some designs (cf. SSTAR or battery type designs) fuel reprocessing 
will be conducted less often and with less generated new fissile material, enhancing thus 
the proliferation resistance. Moreover, recycling and consumption of Pu and MAs from 
existing spent fuel lowers their content in the ultimate waste (hence lowering another 
possible source for proliferation).  
 Some LFR concepts integrate / co-locate fuel reprocessing and fabrication functions 
into the reactor site so that only natural uranium is transported to the site as fuel feed 
and only fission products leave the site for disposal; 
 The possibility of long or very-long core life (and the corresponding increase of the time 
between refueling operations) reduces the proliferation risk associated with fuel 
handling operations. Some designs exist (e.g., SSTAR, CANDLE) which could operate 
for very long periods without refueling; 
 The design robustness, high temperature environment, small footprint, minimization of 
active safety components, and need for remote handling of spent fuel provide basic 
contributions to physical protection. 
In summary, due to the potential for substantial improvements arising from the intrinsic 
characteristics of the coolant as well as from design and safety choices implemented in the 
considered LFR designs, in light of the technology advances and studies completed in recent 
years, it is appropriate to consider that the LFR could provide significant advantages in each of 
the four GIF goal areas. 
 
  




2. Historical review of, and feedback from, past construction and operation 
experiences 
Leo Szilard first proposed the use of a heavy liquid metal (i.e., bismuth) as a reactor coolant in 
1942. Subsequently, the earliest exploration was conducted at the Brookhaven National 
Laboratory in the U.S.A. After encountering difficulties related to the structural material 
compatibility with heavy liquid metals, specifically in oxygen-contaminated systems, the U.S. 
effort was discontinued with all results published in the 1950s [9]. 
A major contribution to the development of lead-cooled reactor technology has been 
accomplished by Soviet and then Russian scientists and industries by actively pursuing R&D 
in the field over a period beginning in the 1950s and continuing to the present day. In the early 
1950s, research and design related to the use of lead-bismuth eutectic (LBE) as the coolant for 
nuclear reactors was initiated in the Soviet Union by Academician A.I. Leipunsky who 
developed an oxide passivation approach to manage materials corrosion through chemical (i.e., 
oxygen) controls in systems involving heavy liquid metals. The principal objective of these 
efforts was the design and construction of nuclear reactors for submarine propulsion. 
In 1963, the first nuclear submarine with LBE-cooled reactors was put into operation in an 
effort entitled “Project 645”. Since 1971, a series of nuclear-powered submarines of the so-
called “Alfa-class” (in the NATO terminology, “Lira-class” in the terminology of the former 
Soviet Union) were put into operation. In total, seven nuclear submarines of the “Alfa/Lira-
class” or “Project 667” and “Project 705/705K” types were constructed and operated, in 
addition to the previous submarine of the “Project 645” type, and two land-based prototypes. 
Overall, about 80 reactor-years of experience and feedback were accumulated during operation 
of these facilities. 
During the land-based testing of prototype LBE-cooled reactors and during submarine 
operations, valuable operating experience feedback was gathered to demonstrate the potential 
of this reactor technology, while also identifying further R&D needs and areas for improvement 
of the implemented technological solutions. Among others, the latter involves [10-12]8: 
 Prevention of water ingress into the reactor from a steam generator tube leak; 
 Prevention of the consequent formation of solid oxide particles in the LBE coolant, 
which might be transported into the core and cause local coolant blockage and 
subsequent partial core melt; 
                                                 
 
8 It must be pointed out that the accidents occurred during submarine operations and they need to be interpreted 
in the context of military/defence applications. For example, as there was the need of continuous operation for 
propulsion purposes also in presence of water leakages on primary side, it led to excessive oxide formation causing 
the accident. Obviously no LFR will be operated in such conditions for civil use: the leakage will be detected and 
repaired before recovering the operation. Water-induced corrosion was not related to the LM technology, while 
LBE freezing was a problem related to compactness of the loop design. As far as 210Po is concerned, there was no 
evidence of crews increased morbidity respect to crews operating submarines with LWR technology. 




 Prevention of water-induced corrosion of the outer piping surfaces, which might lead 
to LBE leakage; 
 Prevention and management of local LBE coolant freezing (e.g., due to heater 
failures); and 
 Prevention and management of radiotoxic 210Po.  
Consequently, in addressing the identified R&D needs, a large experience/knowledge base has 
been acquired in the areas of lead and lead-bismuth coolant technology, corrosion inhibition, 
mass transfer in lead and lead-bismuth circuits, as well as in 210Po management. 
The new Gen-IV nuclear reactor designs based on lead coolants leverage this extensive 
experience which has been further extended by recent experimental work and other 
technological developments. 
As also discussed in the following sections, steam generator leakages can be effectively 
prevented/mitigated by employing more resistant materials and cover gas monitoring systems. 
The past experience with LBE leakage in the primary system specifically highlights the 
importance of strict water and heavy liquid metal chemistry control. The risk of heavy liquid 
metal freezing, pertinent in particular to the loop-type designs, can be effectively managed by 
employing pool-type designs. Finally, the production of 210Po can be minimized and managed 
by employing pure lead and using Po-removal systems, respectively. 
 
3. Level of ongoing safety-related research and development 
Among the performance goals set for future nuclear energy systems, improved safety and higher 
reliability are recognized as essential priorities. In this respect, the IAEA fundamental safety 
objectives, safety principles, and design safety requirements, including the application of the 
concept of Defense-in-Depth, form the basis for the development of LFR designs [13-14]. In 
further support to the LFR design efforts, safety assessments, and a dedicated set of GIF-LFR 
Safety Design Criteria to guide design and licensing processes are also being developed [15].  
In addition, design philosophy, safety characteristics, implemented safety features, and 
assessment methodology follow the high-level safety goals, guidelines, and recommendations 
set for Generation IV reactor concepts [2-3, 16-17]. 
Consequently, the safety architecture of LFRs is based on the following design principles: 
 Safety shall be “built-in” during the design process rather than “added on” at a later 
stage; 
 Defense-in-Depth principles shall be fully implemented in a manner that is 
demonstrably exhaustive, progressive, tolerant, forgiving, and well-balanced (e.g., 
avoiding “cliff edge effects” and providing a sufficient grace period as well as the 
possibility of repair/recovery during accidental situations); 
 A “risk-informed” approach shall be used in the design process, with the deterministic 
approach complemented by a probabilistic one; and 




 The Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) shall be adopted. In particular, 
the Objective Provision Tree (OPT) methodology 9  is the fundamental tool used 
throughout the design process of LFRs. 
The application of the above components shall proceed progressively as the design develops 
using a so-called “graded approach”. 
Additionally, a full description of the safety approach used for the design of LFRs in the 
European Union (EU) can be found in [18]. This, among others, aims at the application of the 
DiD in a balanced and practical way, achieving high robustness of the plant in response to 
accident initiators, but avoiding an “over-design” when added cost would provide only minimal 
or no additional safety benefit. 
An overall analysis of LFR risk and safety features, including the pilot application of the ISAM 
involving the overview of LFR designs’ safety architecture characteristics and performance 
through Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR) and OPT is presented in the GIF White 
Paper on LFR safety [19]. This paper was prepared in cooperation between the RSWG and the 
GIF LFR provisional System Steering Committee. 
As is the case for some other reactor systems, LFR concepts considered within GIF strongly 
rely on passive safety features. This is the case of all three GIF LFR Reference Systems: ELFR 
(EU), BREST (Russian Federation), and SSTAR (US). It has to be particularly noted that the 
decay heat removal (DHR) systems immersed in primary pools of certain LFRs rely on natural 
circulation on both the primary and secondary side (where water or air is usually used). 
Additionally, control rod and shutdown systems rely on buoyancy or are gravity driven.  
These systems have been the subject of experimental qualification programs; for the DHR 
systems in particular, R&D activities are investigating the degree and stability of the established 
natural circulation flow. The relevant qualification programs have either been completed or are 
currently underway. 
Further safety-related R&D is currently ongoing and is expected to be augmented, specifically 
in the area related to fuel-coolant thermodynamic and chemical interactions, including the 
behavior of dispersed fuel, fission, activation, and corrosion products in heavy liquid metal. 
The knowledge of the phenomenology related to lead-water/steam interactions (including the 
degree of steam entrainment, pressure wave propagation, and damping) needs to be improved 
for validation and verification (V&V) of computational tools to analyze Steam Generator Tube 
Ruptures (SGTRs). The facilities to investigate the interaction of heavy liquid metal with high 
pressure water/steam have already been built and are under operation to support these 
                                                 
 
9  The OPT is a top-down method which, for each level of DiD and for each safety objective/function, identifies 
the possible challenges to the safety functions, their related mechanisms and the provisions needed to prevent, 
control or mitigate their consequences. 




investigations. Further code V&V efforts are also necessary for studying possible sloshing 
phenomena related to the high density of lead.  
These activities will together provide necessary insights for a possible practical elimination of 
severe accidents or for implementation of robust measures for their management and for the 
development of related severe accident management guidelines (SAMG). 
Lastly, R&D on material compatibility with heavy liquid metals has historically been and 
continues to be a main R&D topic related to the LFR technology and structural material 
qualification (cf. Sub-section 4.3.1 and Section 8). 
R&D activities are being conducted in the frame of and in support to several LFR technology 
projects, which are currently implemented through respective national programs and conducted 
in international collaborative efforts: MYRRHA in Belgium (SCK•CEN), BREST in the 
Russian Federation (NIKIET), URANUS in Korea (SNU-NUTRECK [20]), CLEAR in China 
(INEST) and ALFRED in Europe. 
 
4. Achievement of fundamental safety functions 
In LFRs, in accordance with safety requirements, the fundamental safety function with respect 
to reactivity control is realized by using at least two independent and diversified systems for 
shutdown of the reactor. Shutdown is then followed by the actuation of dedicated decay heat 
removal systems. 
Each LFR system has specific approaches for the achievement of the reactivity control and 
(decay) heat removal safety functions; however as outlined above, in each case the shutdown 
systems and DHRs operate passively, generally falling into the category of actively actuated, 
passively operated systems (Category D [21]). 
 
4.1 Reactivity control 
4.1.1 Control (and shutdown) systems 
The GIF LFR reference systems feature at least two independent and diversified shutdown 
systems consisting of control rods and shutdown safety rods. Consistent with the single failure 
criterion requirement, one of the two systems is sufficient to shut down the reactor, and the 
shutdown function is also accomplished even when the most reactive rod becomes stuck out of 
the core. 
In some designs, an active mode of operation is also provided, but a back-up passive mode is 
always available. Rods are either inserted from the top of the core using ballast in the upper 
part of control rod assemblies, or they are located below the core and driven up by buoyancy 
force available in lead. In the case of BREST additional reactivity control passive feedback 
based on neutron leakage is also available. Its operation principle lies in changing the neutron 
leakage from the reactor core and, accordingly, the reactivity by means of passive change of 




the lead column height in the reflector blocks according to the reactor coolant head (flow rate)10. 
(Category B [21]). 
The facilities for experimental testing of control (shutdown) systems and their components have 
already been built and tested in lead environment (BREST), or are being planned, in support to 
the qualification of these systems at representative conditions. 
4.1.2 Risk of re-criticality 
The risk of re-criticality is considered to be diminished by the inherent characteristics of lead 
and mitigated by LFR design provisions and especially by its neutronic core design.  
As discussed above, lead has a very high boiling temperature (1749ºC), making coolant boiling 
during accident conditions extremely unlikely. This together with low or negative coolant 
density and void reactivity coefficients (even though such coefficients are typically positive in 
the center of the core) strongly relaxes risks for reactivity insertions during accidental coolant 
heat-up. During the postulated unprotected accidents studied in the design extension domain, 
LFR concepts typically exhibit an overall negative reactivity feedback.  
Challenges to functionality of the control and shutdown rod system, which could be impaired 
by coolant oxidation or excessive corrosion and erosion (possibly also causing blockages due 
to accumulation of oxides or corrosion products) or by coolant solidification due to overcooling, 
should be prevented by reliable control of oxygen dissolved in lead and control of heat transfer 
conditions at the secondary side, respectively. Possible options remain under investigation in 
terms of systems and devices and their reliability targets. This topic is identified as a priority 
R&D need (see Section 8). 
Loss of core geometry (core compaction) is prevented by design provisions such as wrapped 
and/or rigid fuel assemblies, application of fuel assembly distance pads, and seismic isolators. 
Mechanical analyses should demonstrate that the radial pin support (grids/wires) is able to 
maintain core (pin and sub-assembly lattice) geometry, taking into account the relatively large 
pin pitch-to-diameter ratio featured in LFR designs. 
Likewise, the consequences of SGTRs, possibly leading to loss of core geometry and/or 
water/steam entrainment and positive reactivity insertions, are prevented and mitigated by 
design provisions, including the design location of steam generators and the associated lead 
flow path, implementation of rupture disks connected to pressure suppression systems to 
prevent over-pressurization, and adoption  of corrosion resistant materials or surface treatment 
for SG tubes. However, calculations show that in situations when water/steam bubbles would 
be entrained in liquid lead as a consequence of a SGTR, the associated reactivity effects in the 
core would be minimal. These situations are planned to be demonstrated in the next two years 
through experiments at the BFS critical facility in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, as 
                                                 
 
10 There are no mechanical moving parts. 




discussed above, further analytical and experimental R&D assessments are necessary to 
improve our knowledge on the phenomenology and possible consequences of SGTRs [22-23]. 
The risk of re-criticality in case of postulated core disruptive accidents is, based on 
phenomenological analyses and engineering judgment, considered to be low, due to very similar 
densities of lead and mixed oxide or nitride fuels, which is hypothesized to favor fuel dispersion 
(by the buoyancy force) rather than compaction, cf. also Sub-section 5.1. As mentioned earlier, 
further R&D is necessary to understand severe accident phenomena in LFRs comprehensively 
(including phenomena such as fuel dispersion / dissolution / segregation vs. aggregation), 
serving as a basis for the possible practical elimination of severe accidents or development of 
severe accident management strategies. These studies may also lead to the establishment of a 
requirement for specification of a maximum MOX or mixed nitride fuel density for the LFR.  
4.2 Decay heat removal 
4.2.1 Thermal inertia and grace period 
Due to the large volumetric heat capacity of lead (1.54 J/cm3/K) combined with the large 
inventory of the coolant in the primary circuits, LFRs are particularly effective in providing a 
high thermal inertia. This contributes to the slowing down of any transient related to loss of 
forced coolant mass flow or loss of heat sink, resulting in very long grace time periods that are 
available for operator actions [24]. 
Due to the favorable neutronic characteristics of lead allowing larger pin pitches and simple 
flow path designs, that together result in low pressure drop, LFRs typically also feature a high 
natural circulation capability of the coolant in the primary circuit. Hence, even in the case of an 
Unprotected Loss-of-Flow (ULOF) accident, benefitting from the high degree of established 
natural circulation flow, the structural integrity of LFR components and vessel are typically not 
challenged in the medium term. As an example, a preliminary ULOF analysis performed for 
the ALFRED LFR concept in the frame of the EURATOM collaborative project LEADER has 
shown that the mean time for failure is always longer than 24 hours. A sufficient grace time 
(>> 30 min) is thus available for operator intervention to terminate this transient by shutting 
down the reactor manually and to ensure decay heat removal from the primary circuit [24]. 
Lead has a high freezing point (327°C) with the potential for coolant solidification. This might 
lead to the formation of blockages impairing coolant flow and consequently challenging the 
(decay) heat removal function. LFRs therefore adopt reliable monitoring of coolant temperature 
as well as control of heat transfer conditions at the secondary/tertiary side (including actuation 
logics and modes of operation of the DHR systems) to prevent excessive cooling and accidental 
coolant freezing. To support qualification of the envisaged DHR systems and testing of their 
reliability in all operation modes (active/passive), experimental facilities are already in 
operation or are currently being constructed. In addition, it must be noted that the coolant 
solidification was an issue associated with very compact loop configurations (see Section 2). In 
a pool configuration, the situation is different and with multiple flow paths it is extremely 
difficult to get a simultaneous solidification. Note also that a solidification occurring 
simultaneously for all flow paths has a low probability to occur since once a solidification 
occurs in one of the flow paths, it is less likely to occur in other parts. Oxide particles have low 




thermal conductivity so that an accumulation probably reduces the chance of solidification by 
decoupling primary from the secondary.  
Adequate systems for heating of the coolant are also provided, in cases when the decay heat of 
the core would not be sufficient to keep the lead coolant above its melting point. Proper coolant 
melting sequences are devised to avoid mechanical stresses exerted on structures during melting 
operations. Some R&D activity is also needed on this topic, although it is considered a lower 
priority. 
As already discussed above, the accumulation of corrosion products, which might also lead to 
coolant blockages challenging the (decay) heat removal function, should be prevented by 
reliable monitoring and control of the oxygen content in the lead coolant and appropriate 
systems dedicated to maintaining the chemistry and purification of the coolant. This topic is 
also identified as a R&D need (see Section 8). 
4.2.2 Diversification, active and passive systems 
As mentioned earlier, LFRs rely strongly on passive safety systems for both reactivity control 
and decay heat removal, for which the design principles of Defense-in-Depth (i.e., 
independence, diversification, and redundancy) are implemented in all GIF LFR reference 
concepts. The diversity is provided in system configurations and component designs, working 
fluids (lead, water, air), and operational principles (forced circulation, natural convection on 
both the primary and secondary side). Similar to what is already customary for some licensed 
Generation-III/III+ plants (AP1000), the approach to provide protection against abnormal 
occurrences and accidents is usually characterized by the use of non-safety grade active systems 
and non-safety grade emergency supply systems, which is followed by the use of safety-grade 
passive systems in case the active systems are not available. 
The above-described approach is intended to achieve robust safety performance of the plant, 
while substantially reducing the overall “safety cost”. It is facilitated by the specific 
characteristics of lead that support a strong focus on safety which designers implement from 
the very beginning of the system design process. 
These characteristics also support the strategy of decay heat removal in the case of postulated 
core disruptive accidents, like in the case of extreme earthquake. The reactor and safety vessels 
of LFRs are arranged such that a leak in reactor vessel does not result in the uncovering of 
steam generator inlets, and the coolant flow path can hence be maintained, including through 
the DHR systems. In addition, due to the high melting point of lead (327°C), any coolant 
leakage from the primary system will likely start solidifying, preventing a large loss of primary 
coolant. In the case of a very unlikely simultaneous unavailability of steam generators and all 
dedicated DHR systems, the implemented and considered options for ultimate diversified DHR 
include: (i) utilization of the reactor cavity concrete cooling system; and (ii) flooding of the 
reactor cavity with water, see also Section 5. The improved understanding of the severe accident 
phenomena in LFRs will provide the necessary basis for possible practical elimination of severe 
accidents or lead to the development of detailed severe accident management strategies and 
guidelines. The considered options and systems for achieving the DHR removal function in 
case of postulated core disruption accidents needs also to be further assessed.  




4.3 Confinement of radioactive materials 
4.3.1 Materials 
Molten lead is corrosive, and may erode, or otherwise degrade the mechanical properties of 
structural materials; such phenomena, if not adequately controlled, could increase maintenance 
and repair costs and ultimately could also challenge confinement barriers, in particular the fuel 
cladding. In addition, the risk of loss of structural integrity associated with high-temperature 
creep which could result from high coolant temperatures during accidental conditions needs to 
be assessed. Material behavior in heavy liquid metals has therefore historically been a main 
R&D topic related to LFR technology. In this domain, some important technological advances 
have recently been made, although the approach differs substantially in the individual countries. 
The approach adopted by the Russian Federation is an evolution of the experience developed 
in construction and operation of lead-bismuth eutectic cooled reactors for submarine 
propulsion. It is based on the control of oxygen content dissolved in the heavy liquid metal and 
on appropriate coolant purification. Special ferritic-martensitic alloys (with added Si) have been 
developed, and the oxygen control strategies for such systems have proven to be effective in 
corrosion-erosion control, benefiting from investigations conducted in experimental loops with 
controlled temperature and flow conditions as well as in pool configurations11. 
Even though material development has played a very important role in the nuclear industry 
from the beginning because of the need to qualify materials (taking into account ageing effects 
and consequent change in mechanical properties due to exposure to service conditions), this has 
posed serious challenges to the application of new materials in advanced reactor concepts, in 
particular in Europe. The reason has been the absence of irradiation facilities able to reproduce 
the conditions of a fast reactor in a reasonable time frame and at a reasonable cost. As a 
consequence, R&D efforts are now following a different strategy: using materials already 
previously qualified for fast reactor environments, applying corrosion resistant coatings 
(surface modifications) and providing adequate chemistry control of the coolant quality. 
These functionally graded composite coating processes allow for the optimal combination of a 
base metal with proven mechanical properties with a thin and stable outer layer of corrosion-
resistant material. This includes SiO2 surface layers (developed by MIT) and aluminum-oxide 
layers (developed by KIT). A new class of alumina (Al2O3) forming austenitic alloys (AFA), 
which display extraordinary corrosion resistance in lead/LBE12, has also been developed (at a 
number of different institutions including SNU, KTH and ORNL). The long-term behavior of 
these coatings and alumina forming austenitic alloys, considering irradiation, thermal and 
                                                 
 
11 The experience with oxygen / chemistry control in pool configuration includes, among others, the CIRCE 
facility in ENEA Brasimone, Italy (8.5 m height, 1.2 m diameter, ~90 t LBE inventory) and CLEAR-S at 
CAS/INEST Hefei, People’s Republic of China (6.5 m height, 2 m diameter, >200 t LBE inventory). 
12 Long-term corrosion tests of AFA steels (19,000 h) have been performed in lead at 550°C.    




mechanical stresses and the effect of the lead coolant environment, requires an adequate 
qualification program. 
As the primary pump impeller may be exposed, in some LFR designs, to a coolant velocity of 
up to 10 m/s, the special corrosion-erosion resistant technological solutions for this component 
need to be qualified as well. 
4.3.2 Safety barriers 
In accordance with the principle of Defense-in-Depth, LFRs adopt several levels of protection 
including successive safety barriers preventing the release of radioactive material to the 
environment. These include the fuel matrix, the fuel cladding, the boundary of the reactor 
coolant system, and the containment system. The safety concept includes protection of the 
barriers by averting damage to the plant and to the barriers themselves. It further includes 
mitigation measures to protect the public and the environment from harm in case these barriers 
are not fully effective. Specifically, for LFRs, due to the high density of lead and its total 
primary inventory, challenges to the effectiveness and functionality of safety barriers in case of 
external excitations are carefully considered. This includes related mechanical effects due to 
sloshing. 
For fuel cladding, design limits are established on the basis of the maximum fuel temperature 
and burn-up (residence time), with due attention to the accumulated corrosion-erosion and 
irradiation performance data. This includes the data on fuel-cladding interactions, which for 
MOX types of fuel benefit from the extensive operating and qualification feedback conducted 
in the frame of SFR programs (cf. also Sub-section 6.1). 
For the reactor coolant and cover gas boundary, all GIF LFR Reference Systems employ pool-
type configuration with integrated primary components to prevent the loss of primary coolant. 
The considered options are a stainless-steel reactor vessel (for ELFR and SSTAR) and a steel-
lined thermally insulated concrete vault (for BREST). The integrity of the boundary is 
maintained during the plant’s lifetime by limiting the maximum coolant temperature and time 
at that temperature, while also controlling chemistry (oxygen content) in the coolant.  
The configuration of the containment boundary includes safety vessel (for ELFR and SSTAR) 
and multilayer metal concrete structure (for BREST). Their function is to prevent primary 
coolant loss which would result in the uncovering of steam generator inlets (ensuring thus the 
DHR function), as well as to withstand mechanical and thermal loads in accident conditions, 
preventing release of radioactive material to the environment.  
Further details of the related methodology applied in Europe are well described in the Safety 
approach developed in the frame of the EURATOM 7th Framework Programme collaborative 
project LEADER [18]. The approach adopted in the Russian Federation can be considered 
equivalent and substantially in-line. 
4.3.3 Source term 
Concerning the source term, the use of lead coolant is deemed to provide several advantages.  




There are both analytical and experimental indications that lead has a good tendency to retain 
volatile fission products iodine and cesium, as well as polonium13, out of which only small 
fractions are expected to be released to the cover gas and containment [8, 25-27].  
Source term analyses performed in the frame of the EURATOM collaborative project LEADER 
have determined the upper theoretical limits for the releases of iodine, cesium, and polonium in 
case of a postulated core disruptive accident involving the rupture of all claddings of all fuel 
assemblies. It was determined that only a small fraction (depending on the coolant temperature) 
is expected to be volatilized into the cover gas system. Moreover, these results indicated that 
the accompanying source term and the related doses inside the containment are relatively low, 
and the resulting dose in the containment has been evaluated to be below the allowable limit to 
the population (outside containment) during normal operation. In Europe, further R&D studies 
are currently ongoing to verify the corresponding retention capabilities of lead in order to 
reliably evaluate related occupational hazards and possible accidental source terms. It is to be 
noted that these results are specific to the LEADER design concepts, but similar characteristics 
have also been confirmed by studies performed in the Russian Federation and are expected to 
apply to other LFR designs as well. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the chemical interaction of lead with water and air is very 
slow / relatively inert, not supporting significant energy release in the event of accidents. In 
fact, although the reaction is exothermic, reaction kinetics and oxide formation are slow and 
the energy releases small [28]. It has been demonstrated experimentally that in situations 
mimicking steam generator tube ruptures, involving injection of a pressurized steam/water into 
high-temperature molten lead, steam explosions do not occur. Consequently, a rupture of a 
single SG tube has been shown to be limited and will not develop into multiple ruptures of SG 
tubes [29]. Sloshing-related fluid motion is also well bounded in a domain beyond the steam 
generator [30]. For what the oxide formation is concerned during an SGTR, the duration of the 
transients is not expected to give rise to an amount of oxides able to impair safety functions or 
systems, thanks to the slow progression of the oxidation chemical reaction compared to the time 
scale of the accident (usually terminated by SG isolation procedure). 
  
It is important to emphasize that the performance of LFRs with respect to source term 
minimization, considering that the lead coolant exhibits high radionuclide retention and is able 
to provide robust and benign behavior in essentially any accidental conditions, results in the 
possibility of achieving the goal of eliminating the need for off-site emergency response. This 
has been one of the most important drivers for the development of LFR technology both in the 
EU, the Russian Federation, and elsewhere. 
                                                 
 
13  In LFRs, small amounts of 210Po are formed due to extended activation of lead. Systems cooled by lead-bismuth 
eutectic would require an efficient polonium purification system due to the significantly larger rate of 
production from activation of 209Bi, cf. also Sub-section 6.3. 




4.3.4 Containment bypass 
In accordance with the single failure criterion, all lines that penetrate the containment and/or 
that are connected to the cover gas space are fitted with at least two containment isolation valves 
or check valves arranged in series and provided with a suitable leak detection system preventing 
containment bypass. 
The risk for containment bypass due to SGTRs is normally prevented, at design level, by 
adoption of rupture disks on the reactor roof connected to a pressure suppression system and 
SG isolation.  
In case of a severe accident, the risk for containment bypass (specifically if SGs would be 
depressurized) needs to be further evaluated, and a detailed severe accident management 
strategy developed. In this context, it is important to note that it is possible to isolate the SGs, 
since DHR can be achieved by diverse means.  
 
5. Management of design extension conditions (severe accidents) 
Management of design extension conditions is based on the application of Defense-in-Depth, 
involving the control of severe plant conditions, prevention of accident progression, and 
mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents (if not practically eliminated14). Such plant 
conditions of very low probability may be caused by multiple failures or by an extremely 
unlikely event, such as an extreme earthquake. 
5.1 Prevention 
In LFRs, accident prevention is strengthened by several considerations, in addition to the 
fundamentally advantageous characteristics of the coolant (i.e., very high boiling temperature, 
relative inertness in contact with water and air, etc.). These additional considerations include: 
 Systematic application of the principle of the Defense-in-Depth into the design at all 
levels. As for the independence of the different levels of DiD, design features such as 
system and component redundancy, independence (physical separation), and diversity 
are expected to be applied to address the risk of common-course failures (an example 
for the DHR function is given in Sub-section 4.2.2); 
 The large thermal inertia of the plant, which provides considerable grace time (with 
regard to structural integrity) to prevent further accident progression, allowing 
employment of additional non-safety grade and support systems to control and manage 
the accident effectively;  
 Expanded use of passive safety features to achieve the fundamental safety functions 
(control of reactivity and heat removal); 
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 Reduced plant complexity (no intermediate circuit as well as other features); and 
 Optimized human-machine interfaces as well as extended use of information 
technologies (e.g., augmented controls and displays, virtual reality simulators and 
training tools for which development and qualification for NPP is needed). 
As concerns corrosion-erosion, the Defense-in-Depth approach includes: (i) the use of qualified 
materials; (ii) control of oxygen content in the coolant; (iii) redundancy (as appropriate); (iv) 
in-service inspections (ISI) / surveillance; and (v) adequate margins / times to respond.  
Analyses of GIF LFR designs performed according to the established safety approaches in the 
design extension domains have up to now not identified accident sequences which would lead 
to generalized core meltdowns 15 . In the BREST design, implementing wrapper-less fuel 
assemblies, safe operation limits of the cladding are predicted to be maintained during the 
postulated total instantaneous blockage of seven fuel assemblies [29].    
There is a lack of large sources of physical or chemical energy such as primary coolant boiling, 
large generation, and consequently accumulation of hydrogen, as well as a lack of rapid 
chemical reaction between fuel and coolant to challenge safety barriers. There are no rapid 
exothermic reactions between lead and water (as well as air). The phenomenology needs to be 
more fully understood notably as far as the interaction between hot lead and water is concerned. 
This topic is also discussed in Sub-section 4.3.3. 
Nevertheless, severe accidents that could lead to containment barrier failures are considered 
explicitly in the design process of LFRs to analyze the course of an event and devise appropriate 
mitigation measures (if not practically eliminated). 
5.2 Mitigation 
As discussed in reference [19], the essential objectives of the accident management are: 
 To monitor plant status; 
 To maintain core sub-criticality; 
 To protect the integrity of the reactor vessel by ensuring heat removal from the core and 
preventing excessive loading conditions (both thermo-mechanical and chemical); 
 To limit the release of radioactive material to the environment; and 
 To regain and maintain a safe shutdown state. 
In a very unlikely event involving loss of all heat sinks (all DHR and secondary systems), the 
possibility to remove heat by injecting water in the reactor cavity between the reactor and safety 
vessels can be considered, while in case of reactor vessel breach, decay heat can still be removed 
by the reactor cavity concrete cooling system. As discussed earlier, such very ultimate 
provisions can be considered since lead is relatively chemically inert in contact with air and 
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water so that the reactor could be flooded by water. As mentioned earlier, further R&D is 
necessary to assess these options for the ultimate DHR comprehensively. 
5.3 Situations that are practically eliminated 
The practical elimination of certain accident situations in LFRs is based on utilization of the 
intrinsic features of lead as a coolant (high boiling point, relative inertness in contact with air 
and water, natural convection capability, and thermal inertia) as well as the application of the 
fundamental principles of Defense-in-Depth. In terms of the decay heat removal, this 
particularly concerns the enhanced redundancy, independence as well as diversity in operational 
modes (forced/natural convection on both primary and secondary side), system/component 
designs, and use of working fluids (lead, water, air), cf. Sub-section 4.2.2.    
In Europe, in the frame of the EURATOM project LEADER, the following initiating events 
and sequences have, among others, been identified as “practically eliminated” [22]: 
 Large core compaction due to changes in core geometry as a result of large internal or 
external excitations (e.g., due to an extreme earthquake); 
 Large removal of absorbing material;  
 Core uncovering due to primary coolant loss (resulting in loss of DHR function). Note 
that one goal of LFR design is that the simultaneous rupture of the reactor vessel and 
the safety vessel can be demonstrated to be extremely unlikely with a high confidence 
level, and needs not to be considered; 
 Reactor vessel break (the vessel support function).  
The categorization and any possible related justifications allowing the “practical elimination” 
of these initiating event and sequences will be further developed in concert with the progress 
of the design and current state of knowledge developed on the basis of ongoing R&D. 
6. Safety of the fuel cycle  
6.1 Type of fuel 
The reference fuels considered for deployment in the LFR are of the oxide or nitride ceramic 
types.  
MOX fuels have been developed in the framework of SFR deployment, mainly in Europe and 
Japan. Several technologies available or being currently developed are directly applicable to 
LFRs. This concerns in particular the choice of a recycling strategy, related fuel fabrication 
(including the application of advanced ‒ minor actinide bearing ‒ fuels) as well as reprocessing 
technologies. Further advancements are envisaged for LFRs, including the evaluation of new 
fuel cladding materials. 
Mixed nitride fuels (MN) have been adopted as a reference in the Russian Federation, since 
they provide a number of advantages, such as high density, high thermal conductivity, lower 
operating temperatures (with a consequent higher coefficient of Doppler reactivity feedback), 
high melting point and higher capability to retain fission products, as well as lower gas pressure 
in the cladding. 




A specific feature of nitrides is their susceptibility to decomposition into a liquid or gaseous 
metal and nitrogen gas at very high temperatures (e.g., during transient involving power 
excursion). A fuel qualification programme for the use of mixed nitride fuels under operational 
and accidental conditions is ongoing in the Russian Federation [31]. While the BREST concept 
uses nitride fuel with a natural isotopic composition of nitrogen, enrichment of nitrogen in 15N 
is also considered for commercial units to further improve the economic performance and avoid 
the production of radiologically hazardous 14C, which in any case is immobilized during fuel 
reprocessing in solid phase. Note that a nitride fuel processing facility is expected to come 
online as part of the BREST development in Russia in 2022. 
With oxide or nitride fuels, fuel-cladding chemical interaction can be prevented, hence enabling 
load-following operations with a fast peak-load management capability which can enable 
generation of electricity at the highest rates in certain areas. For this purpose, further R&D and 
continuation of the fuel qualification programs is also required.    
6.2 3Management of waste (quantity, quality) 
Spent fuel can be recycled using both aqueous and dry (pyro) processing, with the recycled 
waste conditioned and disposed of using the technologies developed in the framework of the 
SFR deployment programs. 
In this context, pyro-processing has been developed in the U.S.A and elsewhere to reduce 
oxides to metals for processing. The metallic product can then be oxidized to fabricate fuels. 
Recently, it has been shown at laboratory scale that the final salt wastes can be decontaminated 
to leave only intermediate level wastes for disposal, as summarized by SNU.   
In Russia, non-aqueous technologies of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing have been under 
development for many years, including reprocessing of the dense fuel from fast reactors. These 
technologies are characterized as being compact, radiation resistant and producing low amounts 
of secondary wastes.  
However, somewhat low decontamination factors might be their disadvantage. The use of 
combined technologies based on non-aqueous methods and aqueous processes for reprocessing 
of SNF with high burn-up and short cooling time could lead to significant cost cutting. These 
methods utilize non-aqueous head operations, allowing the cleanup of fissile materials from 
fission products by 2–3 orders of magnitude, and then reprocessing them using 
hydrometallurgical methods. For fast reactor mixed nitride U-Pu (MNUP) spent fuel it has been 
suggested to combine the primary pyrochemical processing with hydrometallurgical refining. 
These technologies also enable recovery of 15N and separation of 14C for recycling and disposal, 
respectively.   
All these experiences are directly applicable to LFR fuel recycling. 
Disposition of the lead coolant at the end of the plant life could be carried out by solidification 
and storage / disposition.  
The feasibility of a possible re-use / recycling of lead, further supporting the objective of 
sustainability, is a subject of ongoing R&D. 




6.3 Radiation protection 
Radiation exposure to LFR operating personnel is expected to be low since most of the 
maintenance operations will be performed remotely. The radiation shielding properties of lead 
coolant are an additional benign factor. It is noted that pure lead is not exempt from the 
formation of polonium, albeit at very low levels. This is due to 209Bi impurities present in lead 
and 209Bi generation after an extended operation through the (n,) reaction on 208Pb, followed 
by further activation of bismuth. However, the production rate of polonium in lead coolant is 
very low, depending on its purity, and at least three orders of magnitude lower than in LBE. 
Additionally, a preliminary analysis has shown that due to the tendency of lead to retain 
polonium and other radioactive elements, only a small fraction of polonium and other 
radioactive elements is expected to be volatilized to the cover gas, thus controlling risks to 
operating personnel. Further R&D is necessary to confirm these conclusions. 
 
7. Other risks 
7.1 Chemical risk 
As mentioned earlier, lead has been chosen in great part because of its relative chemical 
inertness in contact with air and water. From the toxicological point of view, the operating 
conditions of LFRs are such that they ensure that concentrations of lead vapor in the cover gas 
will be maintained well below the limits for occupational exposures benefitting from the low 
partial pressure of lead vapor (2.9·10-5 Pa at 400ºC). The risk is considered to be very well 
manageable due to such low partial pressure in typical environmental conditions and during 
operations conducted by the personnel. 
7.2 Others 
Similarly to other liquid metals, lead is opaque. The consequent lack of ability for visual 
inspection makes fuel handling and in-service inspections and repairs (ISI&R) of internal 
components difficult. ISIs are typically carried out by ultrasonic devices, for which the 
technology has been developed in the context of SFR programs. Inside the containment, ISI 
activities are performed during outage periods. In this context, considerations need to be given 
to relatively high temperatures of cold shutdown of LFRs (ca. 380°C).  
In Europe, each component inside the LFR reactor vessel is designed to be removable for 
inspection and maintenance. As such, all inspection activities (e.g., visual observation, surface 
examination, volumetric examination with X-ray or ultrasonic devices) will be performed out 
of lead and thus under the full visibility. Also, refueling operations can be done without a need 
for in-vessel machines. The in-service inspection of the reactor vessel (forming part of the 
second barrier) can be accomplished by ultrasonic inspection.  
In the Russian Federation, the approach to ISI&R is similar, but refueling is done by in-vessel 
machines. 
A method for high-temperature chemical cleaning / removal of the residual lead layer from the 
components for ISI&R has been developed and experimentally tested. 




Large quantities of coolant in the main vessel pool of LFRs may lead to complex flow patterns 
and interactions between the coolant and structures, specifically in case of large external 
excitations (such as an extreme earthquake). Coolant sloshing is taken into account in the 
mechanical design of the components. Application of dedicated anti-sloshing devices is also 
envisaged to prevent / suppress the sloshing effects. In Europe, the topic is addressed by the 
adoption of 2D seismic isolators under the primary building that reduce loads caused by 
horizontal oscillations. While substantial progress has been made, further R&D is necessary in 
the field, including possible development of dedicated anti-sloshing devices. 
 
8. Summary of progress needed 
Safety-related R&D is currently ongoing in relation to the needs of the individual GIF LFR 
concepts, notably in the Russian Federation (to increase the level of design justification in 
support of licensing of the BREST-OD-300 system), in Europe (in support to further design 
development of the MYRRHA irradiation facility and ALFRED demonstrator), in Korea (in 
support of small modular reactor URANUS), and in China (in support to further design 
development and licensing of the CLEAR series).   
Based on the LFR project needs, further safety-related R&D efforts are expected to focus on 
the following topics: 
 Structural materials compatibility with heavy liquid metals, including the synergetic 
effects (of thermo-mechanical load and irradiation exposure); 
 Development and qualification of new corrosion resistant materials (including surface 
modifications) to increase operating temperatures; 
 Coolant chemistry, oxygen control, and purification, especially for large pools and with 
the aim of maintaining the coolant specifications and functionality of the main safety 
systems; 
 Phenomenology and prevention of coolant freezing, with particular reference to decay 
heat removal systems; 
 Phenomenology of lead-water/steam interactions to analyze consequences of SGTR; 
 Fuel-coolant thermodynamic and chemical interactions, including the behavior of 
dispersed fuel, and retention of fission and activation products in heavy liquid metal, 
forming also a basis for practical elimination or development of severe accident 
management strategies and guidelines; 
 Seismic isolation and prevention / mitigation of possible sloshing; 
 Innovative technologies for ISI&R and fuel/component handling; 
 Innovative MA-bearing, high burn-up fuels, in the conditions of closed fuel cycles; 
 Further development and qualification of LFR-specific modelling methodologies, as 
well as design and safety assessment tools; 
 Development of design codes and standards for design of mechanical components 
taking into account environmental effects of heavy liquid metals. 
Gaining safety and operational experience feedback from licensing and operation of 
demonstration plants is considered a necessary step to further improve safety, reliability, and 
operational performance of Generation IV LFR concepts. 
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